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INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, malpractice actions against patent attorneys were 
rare.1  The last two decades brought dramatic changes in this area 
of legal malpractice.2  A recent American Bar Association study 
shows a significant increase in the number of filed legal malprac-
tice claims and their severity.3  Claims against patent attorneys 
1  B. Joan Holdridge, Malpractice of Patent Attorneys, 7 CLEV.-MARSHALL L. REV. 
345, 345 (1958).  “[T]here are numerous cases in which an attorney’s negligence or in-
competence has caused a patentee to lose some of his rights under the law, but very few 
in which a patent attorney has actually been sued for malpractice.” Id. at 352. 
2  3 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 24:24 (2008) 
[hereinafter MALLEN & SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE] (noting that before the 1990’s, only 
a few malpractice cases were brought against intellectual property attorneys); see also 
The Legal Malpractice Climate is Ever Changing, ADVOCATE (Bar Plan Mutual Ins. Co., 
St. Louis, MO), Winter 2006, at 1 [hereinafter The Legal Malpractice Climate]. 
3  AM. BAR ASS’N, PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 2000–2003 (noting a ma-
jor increase in the number of claims settled for more than two million dollars). 
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were not an exception.4  Malpractice has become a serious concern 
for patent law practitioners and their insurance providers.5 
While some industry observers attribute the rising severity of 
legal malpractice claims to the use of unconventional legal theories 
and increasing defense costs,6 others believe that each area of legal 
practice has its own unique problems leading to the increase in 
malpractice litigation.7  Discussing patent-specific reasons, some 
legal scholars and commentators point out that over the last two 
decades, patents have become more valuable, patent infringement 
damages more generous, and patent attorneys’ legal fees increas-
ingly high.8  For example, in patent infringement litigation that 
gave rise to a legal malpractice action of Theis Research, Inc. 
(“Theis”) against Brown & Bain, P.A., a California and Arizona 
law firm,9 the court found that the two allegedly infringed claims 
of Theis’s patent were invalid,10 dashing the hopes of the company 
and its investors.11  Theis received no return on years of its re-
4  A. Samuel Oddi, Patent Attorney Malpractice:  An Oxymoron No More, 2004 U. ILL. 
J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 6 (2004) [hereinafter Oddi, Patent Attorney Malpractice] 
(“[C]ourts have decided at least three times the number of malpractice cases against pat-
ent attorneys in the past fourteen years as in the first two hundred years of our federal 
patent system.”). 
5  See, e.g., Sean B. Seymore, The Competency of State Courts to Adjudicate Patent-
Based Malpractice Claims, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 443, 446 (2006) [hereinafter Seymore, The 
Competency of State Courts] (reporting that a significant increase in malpractice insur-
ance premiums for patent attorneys makes it difficult for some patent law firms to find an 
insurance provider). 
6  The Legal Malpractice Climate, supra note 2, at 1. 
7  DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 484 (2001). 
8  See Oddi, Patent Attorney Malpractice, supra note 4, at 6–8. 
9  Theis Research, Inc. v. Brown & Bain, P.A., 400 F.3d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 2005) (af-
firming denial of the plaintiff’s motion to vacate a zero dollar legal malpractice arbitra-
tion award against the law firm of Brown & Bain).  In 2004, Brown & Bain, P.A. became 
a part of Perkins Coie LLP. See Press Release, Perkins Coie LLP, Perkins Coie LLP and 
Brown & Bain, P.A. to Join Forces (June 23, 2004), http://www.perkinscoie.com/news/ 
news_detail.aspx?news=134. 
10  See Brief for Appellant Theis Research, Inc. at 4, Octel Commc’ns Corp. v. Theis 
Research, Inc., 12 F. App’x 915 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 20, 2000) (No. 00-1031). 
11  Octel Commc’ns Corp., 12 F. App’x 915 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming a judgment de-
claring two Theis’s patent claims infringed and invalid for obviousness); see also Dennis 
Crouch, Patent holder barred from reopening malpractice arbitration, Posting to Patently-
O Patent Law Blog (Nov. 8, 2004, 02:31 PM), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2004/11/patent_holder_b.html [hereinafter Crouch]. 
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search work, and Brown & Bain lost millions of dollars it invested 
into the case.12 
In this environment, high expectations of clients frustrated by 
perceived sub-standard performance of patent attorneys and high 
legal fees lead to a larger number of legal malpractice claims in the 
patent law area.13  In addition, attorneys’ actions to recover fees 
often result in clients’ counterclaims for legal malpractice.14
Legal malpractice actions are predominantly state tort and con-
tract law claims even in the cases where the underlying action or 
transaction is governed by federal patent law.15  Nevertheless, the 
resolution of a malpractice action may depend on a resolution of a 
substantial issue of patent law,16 which provides a good argument 
in favor of exclusive federal jurisdiction over such malpractice ac-
tions under 28 U.S.C. § 1338.17  Until recently, however, federal 
courts declined jurisdiction over patent law malpractice actions in 
the absence of diversity.18 
12  See Crouch, supra note 11. 
13  See Seymore, The Competency of State Courts, supra note 5, at 444–46. 
14  See, e.g., Hill, Van Santen, Steadman & Simpson, P.C. v. Axxess Entry Techs., Inc., 
No. 90 C 3854, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 485, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 1993).  In response 
to a patent attorney’s action for legal fees, the client filed a two-count legal malpractice 
counterclaim alleging professional negligence and breach of contract. See, e.g., Mark 
C.S. Bassingthwaighte & Reba J. Nance, The Top Ten Causes of Malpractice—And How 
You Can Avoid Them, Presentation at the ABA Techshow 2006 (April 20–22, 2006), 
available at http://www.abanet.org/lpm/lpt/articles/tch12062.pdf. 
15  See 1 MALLEN & SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 2, § 8:1 (“Most actions 
brought by clients against their attorneys are for negligence, fiduciary breach, breach of 
contract or fraud.”).  Note that an attorney’s violation of state or U.S. Patent and Trade-
mark Office ethical standards may also lead to malpractice suits. See 2 MALLEN & SMITH, 
LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 2, § 20:7. See generally David Hricik, How Things 
Snowball:  The Ethical Responsibilities and Liability Risks Arising from Representing a 
Single Client in Multiple Patent-Related Representations, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 421 
(2005); David Hricik, Trouble Waiting to Happen: Malpractice and Ethical Issues in 
Patent Prosecution, 31 AIPLA Q.J. 385 (2003). 
16  See, e.g., Seymore, The Competency of State Courts, supra note 5, at 454–55 (noting 
that adjudication of some patent malpractice actions implicates complex issues of patent 
law and requires understanding of the science and technology involved in the contro-
versy). 
17  See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006).  The statute provides:  “The district courts shall 
have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to 
patents . . . .  Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent . . . 
cases.” Id. 
18  See infra Part II.C for a detailed discussion. 
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Part I of this Comment provides an overview of state law that 
governs legal malpractice actions arising from patent prosecution 
and litigation.  Part II starts with a discussion of the sources of fed-
eral jurisdiction followed with a review of the application of the 
well-pleaded complaint rule in patent law cases.  Part II also exam-
ines how courts had treated jurisdictional issues in patent law mal-
practice cases before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit decided Air Measurement Technologies, Inc. v. Akin Gump 
Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP19 and Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright 
& Jaworski, LLP20 in the fall of 2007.  Part III uses the legal back-
ground provided in Parts I and II for a detailed analysis of these 
two cases where the Federal Circuit held that federal courts have 
exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over legal malpractice claims 
that necessarily depend on a resolution of a substantial question of 
patent law.  Part III also discusses possible implications of these 
Federal Circuit decisions. 
I. LEGAL MALPRACTICE IN PATENT CASES: CAUSE OF ACTION 
AND APPLICABLE LAW 
A. Selecting a Cause of Action 
When suing their attorneys, clients can potentially pursue sev-
eral distinct causes of action including breach of fiduciary duty, 
breach of contract, and the tort of professional negligence.21  
While some courts consider claims for breach of contract, breach 
of fiduciary duty, the tort of legal malpractice (professional negli-
gence), and other tort claims to be distinct causes of action,22 many 
19  Air Measurement Tech., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, 504 F.3d 
1262 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
20  Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
21  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 48–56 (2000); 4 
MALLEN & SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 2, § 34:8; Ray Ryden Anderson & 
Walter W. Steele, Jr., Fiduciary Duty, Tort and Contract: A Primer on the Legal Mal-
practice Puzzle, 47 SMU L. REV. 235, 235 (1994) [hereinafter Anderson & Steele, Fidu-
ciary Duty, Tort and Contract]. 
22  See, e.g., Stanley v. Richmond, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 768, 776 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (not-
ing that under California law, “breach of fiduciary duty is a species of tort distinct from a 
cause of action for professional negligence”); Brownell v. Garber, 503 N.W.2d 81, 87 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that under Michigan law, “fraud is distinct from malprac-
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courts ignore the distinctions and prefer to treat all such actions as 
torts for legal malpractic 23
For example, New York State courts treat legal malpractice ac-
tions sounding in contract and those sounding in tort essentially the 
same way.24  To prevail in a legal malpractice action under New 
York law, in addition to the existence of an attorney-client rela-
tionship at the time of the alleged malpractice, a plaintiff must 
show: “(1) the negligence of the attorney; (2) that the negligence 
was the proximate cause of the loss sustained; and (3) . . . actual 
damages.”25  In InKine Pharmaceutical Co. v. Coleman,26 the 
plaintiff alleged breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty 
claims in addition to legal malpractice claims in a suit against at-
torneys who failed to timely file a patent application in Asia.27  
The court affirmed dismissal of the breach of contract and breach 
of fiduciary duty claims “as duplicative, since they arose from the 
 
tice” since “the interest involved in a claim for damages arising out of a fraudulent mis-
representation differs from the interest involved in a case alleging that a professional 
breached the applicable standard of care”). 
23  See, e.g., Omlin v. Kaufman & Cumberland Co., 8 F. App’x 477, 479 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(“‘[M]alpractice by any other name still constitutes malpractice. . . .  It makes no differ-
ence whether the professional misconduct is found in tort or contract, it still constitutes 
malpractice.’” (applying Ohio law and quoting Muir v. Hadler Real Estate Mgmt. Co., 
446 N.E.2d 820, 822 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982))); see also Limor v. Buerger, 322 B.R. 781, 
824, 825 (Bankr. D. Tenn. 2005) (“Under Tennessee law, the statute of limitations for 
‘actions and suits against attorneys . . . for malpractice, whether the actions are grounded 
or based in contract or tort’ is one year.” (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-104 (2005))); 
Anderson & Steele, Fiduciary Duty, Tort and Contract, supra note 21, at 235, 240 n.3 
(noting that regardless of the alleged cause of action, courts often treat claims of clients 
for misbehavior of their attorneys as tort actions for malpractice); Mitchell L. Lathrop, 
The Exposure of the Patent Attorney to Claims for Legal Malpractice: The New Frontier, 
3 AIPLA Q.J. 221, 226 (1975) [hereinafter Mitchell L. Lathrop, The Exposure of the Pat-
ent Attorney] (noting that “[t]he traditional distinction between [legal malpractice] actions 
sounding in contract and those sounding in tort are rapidly becoming blurred and, in 
some jurisdictions, obliterated altogether”).  For a detailed discussion of the legal mal-
practice cause of action, see generally 23 CAUSES OF ACTION 589 (West 2007). 
24  For a detailed discussion of New York legal malpractice law, see N.Y. JUR. 2d §§ 
37–80 (West 2008). 
25  Murphy v. Stein, 549 N.Y.S.2d 53, 55 (App. Div. 1989) (citing Mendoza v. 
Schlossman, 448 N.Y.S.2d 45, 46 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982)); see also Marshall v. Nacht, 
569 N.Y.S.2d 113, 114 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991). 
26  InKine Pharm. Co. v. Coleman, 759 N.Y.S.2d 62 (App. Div. 2003). 
27  Id. at 63. 
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same facts as the legal malpractice claim and allege[d] similar 
damages.”28 
In contrast, under California law, claims against an attorney 
may include professional negligence, breach of contract, breach of 
fiduciary duty, fraud, infliction of emotional distress, and other tort 
claims.29  Although California and New York courts define ele-
ments of a malpractice cause of action in a similar way, California 
courts allow a malpractice plaintiff to assert other causes of action 
arising from an attorney’s malfeasance.30  For example, in 
Rosenberg v. Hillshafer,31 the court permitted a former client to 
assert claims of legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress against her attorney 
and attorney’s law firm.32  In Wolk v. Green,33 a diversity case un-
der California law, the court allowed the plaintiff to sue her former 
attorney for “legal malpractice, extortion, misrepresentation, 
breach of fiduciary duty, willful misconduct, breach of contract, 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, infliction of emotional 
distress, elder fraud abuse and unjust enrichment.”34 
Malpractice claims based on a breach of fiduciary duty involve 
allegations of an attorney’s breach of a duty of confidentiality and 
undivided loyalty owed to the client.35  Such claims often arise in a 
conflict of interest context where a patent attorney or a law firm 
28  Id.; see also Ciocca v. Neff, No. 02 Civ. 5067, 2005 WL 1473819, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 22, 2005) (dismissing a breach of contract and a promissory estoppel claims as re-
dundant under New York law in a legal malpractice case). 
29  See, for example, CAL. CIV. PRAC. TORTS § 33:1 (2008) and cases cited therein. 
30  See, e.g., Kairos Scientific Inc. v. Fish & Richardson, P.C., Nos. A107085, A107086, 
2006 WL 171921, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2006) (“A cause of action for legal mal-
practice requires evidence of the following four elements: ‘(1) the duty of the attorney to 
use such skill, prudence, and diligence as members of his or her profession commonly 
possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection be-
tween the breach and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from 
the attorney’s negligence.’” (quoting Coscia v. McKenna Cuneo, 25 P.3d 670, 672 (Cal. 
2001))); see also CAL. CIV. PRAC. TORTS § 33:1, supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
31  Rosenberg v. Hillshafer, No. B191950, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9454 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2007). 
32  Id. at *1. 
33  Wolk v. Green, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
34  Id. at 1127. 
35  See 2 MALLEN & SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 2, § 15:2. 
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represents clients with adverse interests.36  For example, in G.D. 
Searle & Co. v. Pennie & Edmonds LLP,37 former law firm clients, 
G.D. Searle & Co., Inc. (“Searle”), Pfizer, Inc. (“Pfizer”), and the 
University of Rochester, alleged a breach of fiduciary duty claim-
ing that the law firm made simultaneous adverse representations on 
their respective behalves with regards to the same technology—
COX-2 inhibitors.38  Some jurisdictions only prohibit multiple rep-
resentations with actual adversity among clients; in New York, 
however, this prohibition reaches representations with even the ap-
pearance of impropriety and conflict of interest.39 
The choice of legal theory and court’s categorization of the ac-
tion can affect the outcome of the case.40  For example, the statute 
of limitations period for tort claims may differ from that for con-
tract claims.41  In Hutchinson v. Smith,42 the Supreme Court of 
Mississippi reversed dismissal of a legal malpractice action as 
barred by a three-year statute of limitations for unwritten contracts 
and held that the malpractice action sounded in tort and the six-
year statute of limitations for tort actions applied.43  The Supreme 
Court of Hawaii, on the other hand, held that, for the purposes of 
36  See generally David Hricik, The Risks and Responsibilities of Attorneys and Firms 
Prosecuting Patents for Different Clients in Related Technologies, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP. 
L.J. 331 (2000). 
37  G.D. Searle & Co. v. Pennie & Edmonds LLP, No. 602374/00, 2004 N.Y. Slip Op. 
51874U (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 14, 2004). 
38  Id. at *2.  Pfizer alleged, inter alia, that in 1998 Pennie & Edmonds partners, Paul De 
Stefano and Laura A. Coruzzi, who represented the University of Rochester, failed to re-
spond to an internal “conflicts memo” with regards to Searle’s retention of the firm in 
COX-2 patent matters, and that they drafted the University’s patent specifically to cover 
drugs Pfizer and Searle were about to start marketing. Id.  Within a month after this deci-
sion, in a patent infringement action of the University of Rochester against Searle, the 
Federal Circuit affirmed a summary judgment for Searle, declaring the University’s pat-
ent procured by Pennie & Edmonds invalid “for failure to meet the written description 
and enablement requirements.” Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 
919 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  A few months later, the law firm settled the malpractice case. See 
Docket for Pennie & Edmonds, No. 602374/00, 2004 N.Y. Slip Op. 51874U. 
39  Pennie & Edmonds, 2004 N.Y. Slip Op. 51874U, at *1 (quoting In re Hof, 478 
N.Y.S.2d 39, 42 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984)). 
40  4 MALLEN & SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 2, § 34:8; Anderson & Steele, 
Fiduciary Duty, Tort and Contract, supra note 21, at 235. 
41  4 MALLEN & SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 2, § 34:8. 
42  Hutchinson v. Smith, 417 So. 2d 926 (Miss. 1982). 
43  Id. at 929–30. 
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the statute of limitations, all legal malpractice actions are actions in 
contract and reversed dismissal of the action under the shorter stat-
ute of limitations for torts.44 
In Omlin v. Kaufman & Cumberland Co.,45 the court treated 
plaintiff’s contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and tort claims 
against her former attorneys as a single legal malpractice claim.46  
Thus, the Omlin court affirmed dismissal of the claim as barred by 
the one-year Ohio malpractice statute of limitations47 because the 
plaintiff did not file her claim within one year from the termination 
of her attorney-client relationship with the defendant attorney.48 
The pleaded cause of action may also affect the availability of 
prejudgment interest, punitive damages, or a contributory negli-
gence defense.  For example, the plaintiff can recover prejudgment 
interest in contract but not in tort claims, while contributory negli-
gence defense and punitive damages are only available in tort ac-
tions.49  In addition, compared to a malpractice action sounding in 
contract that is only available to a plaintiff who is in privity of con-
tract with the defendant, the permissible category of plaintiffs may 
be significantly wider for a malpractice action sounding in tort.50 
The pleaded cause of action and the relief sought may also de-
termine the availability of attorney fees in a legal malpractice ac-
tion.  For example, in Helfand v. Gerson,51 decided under Hawai-
ian law, former clients sued their attorney and his law firm alleging 
negligence, breach of contract, breach of express and implied war-
ranties, and legal malpractice.52  Since at least two of the four al-
leged causes of action sounded in contract and because the plain-
tiffs sought to recover attorney fees available in actions in the 
nature of the assumpsit,53 but not in tort actions,54 the Ninth Cir-
44  Higa v. Mirikitani, 517 P.2d 1, 3–6 (Haw. 1973). 
45  Omlin v. Kaufman & Cumberland Co., 8 F. App’x 477 (6th Cir. 2001). 
46  Id. at 479. 
47  See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11(A)(1) (LexisNexis 2008). 
48  Omlin, 8 F. App’x 477, 479 (6th Cir. 2001). 
49  See 4 MALLEN & SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 2, § 34:8. 
50  See Mitchell L. Lathrop, The Exposure of the Patent Attorney, supra note 23, at 228–
31 (discussing liability of patent attorneys to non-clients). 
51  Helfand v. Gerson, 105 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1997). 
52  Id. at 533–34, 537. 
53  Id. at 537 (“Assumpsit is a common law form of action which allows for the recov-
ery of damages for the non-performance of a contract, either express or implied, written 
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cuit held that the plaintiffs’ action was in the nature of the assump-
sit and affirmed the award of attorney fees to the defendants who 
prevailed in the court below.55
B. Choice of Law Issues 
When a legal malpractice action arises from acts or omissions 
that occurred in more than one state, the availability of a particular 
liability theory may depend on which law governs the underlying 
action and the malpractice action itself.56  On the other hand, the 
choice of law may depend on the plaintiff’s selection of a legal 
theory.57  For example, some states use different choice of law 
rules for tort and contract claims.58  Therefore, a plaintiff’s deci-
sion to frame a legal malpractice action as a contract claim, as op-
posed to a tort claim, may result in the application of law of a dif-
ferent state.59 
To determine which choice of law rules apply to a legal mal-
practice action, the court may also have to determine whether con-
flicting laws are substantive or procedural, since the law of the fo-
rum usually governs procedural issues, while the forum’s choice of 
 
or verbal, as well as quasi contractual obligations.” (citing Schulz v. Honsador, Inc., 690 
P.2d 279, 281 (Haw. 1984))). 
54  See id. at 536–38; see also HAW. REV. STAT. § 607–14 (2008) (“In all the courts, in 
all actions in the nature of assumpsit . . . there shall be taxed as attorneys’ fees, to be paid 
by the losing party and to be included in the sum for which execution may issue, a fee 
that the court determines to be reasonable . . . .”). 
55  See Helfand, 105 F.3d 530, 538–39 (9th Cir. 1997). 
56  See 4 MALLEN & SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 2, § 34:8. 
57  See, e.g., Acme Circus Operating Co. v. Kuperstock, 711 F.2d 1538, 1540 (11th Cir. 
1983) (applying California choice of law rules).   
The first step in choice of law analysis is to ascertain the nature of the 
problem involved, i.e. is the specific issue at hand a problem of the 
law of contracts, torts, property, etc.  The second step is to determine 
what choice of law rule the state of California applies to that type of 
legal issue.  The third step is to apply the proper choice of law rule to 
the instant facts and thereby conclude which state’s substantive law 
applies. 
Id. 
58  See id. 
59  For example, Florida uses the traditional choice of law rule for contract cases and 
modern “most significant relationship” methodology for tort cases. See infra notes 74–75 
and accompanying text.  
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law rules determine which law applies to substantive issues.60  A 
federal court sitting in diversity or exercising supplemental juris-
diction over state claims applies choice of law rules of the forum 
state.61  If a district court transfers such action to another district 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the transferee court applies the 
substantive law, including choice of law rules, of the state in which 
the transferor court sits.62  For example, in First Trust N.A. v. 
Moses & Singer,63 a legal malpractice case transferred from the 
Southern District of Mississippi to the Southern District of New 
York, the court applied Mississippi substantive law and choice of 
law rules.64 
Attorneys and their clients can contractually define which law 
governs actions arising from a breach of the retainer agreement, 
including malpractice claims.65  Otherwise, if the acts that gave 
rise to a malpractice action against the attorneys occurred in sev-
eral states, the court will have to decide which law applies.66  First, 
the court will determine if there is a true conflict between relevant 
laws of the jurisdictions involved.67  Only if a true conflict exists, 
will the court use its choice of law rules to resolve that conflict.68 
60  See 4 MALLEN & SMITH,  LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 2, § 34:8. 
61  See, e.g., Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (“The con-
flict of laws rules to be applied by the federal court in Delaware must conform to those 
prevailing in Delaware’s state courts.”); Paracor Fin., Inc. v. GE Capital Corp., 96 F.3d 
1151, 1164 (1996) (“In a federal question action where the federal court is exercising 
supplemental jurisdiction over state claims, the federal court applies the choice-of-law 
rules of the forum state . . . .”). 
62  See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 519 (1990) (holding that a § 1404(a) 
venue transfer should not deprive parties of state-law advantages of the transferor court 
forum state regardless of which party initiated the transfer); Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 
U.S. 612, 639 (1964) (“A change of venue under § 1404(a) generally should be, with re-
spect to state law, but a change of courtrooms.”). 
63  First Trust N.A. v. Moses & Singer, No. 99 Civ. 1947, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10957 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2000). 
64  Id. at *10. 
65  See, e.g., Expansion Pointe Props. L.P. v. Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, 
LLP, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 166, 180 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that choice of law provi-
sions in a retainer agreement were enforceable in a legal malpractice action of a former 
client against its attorneys). 
66  See 4 MALLEN & SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 2, § 34:8. 
67  Id. 
68  Id. 
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Jurisdictions that adhere to the traditional approach in deciding 
choice of law questions apply the law of the place where injury oc-
curred for tort claims,69 the law of the place of contract for claims 
arising from the formation of the contract,70 and the law of the 
place of performance for contract claims arising from the perform-
ance of the contract.71 
Many jurisdictions abandoned the traditional choice of law rule 
in favor of the “most significant relationship” approach of the Re-
statement (Second) of Conflict of Laws and other modern choice 
of law methodologies for tort72 and contract cases.73  In some 
69  See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378 (1934) (for tort claims “[t]he 
law of the place of wrong determines whether a person has sustained a legal injury”); see 
also Dowis v. Mud Slingers, Inc., 621 S.E.2d 413, 419 (Ga. 2005) (reaffirming Georgia’s 
adherence to the traditional choice of law rule in tort cases); Simon v. United States, 805 
N.E.2d 798, 804–07 (Ind. 2004) (reaffirming Indiana’s adherence to the traditional choice 
of law rule in tort cases); Michael Ena, Note, Choice of Law and Predictability of Deci-
sions in Products Liability Cases, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1417, 1420–25 (2007) (discuss-
ing application of the traditional choice of law rule in tort cases).  The traditional choice 
of law rule that prescribes use of the law of the place of injury is also known as lex loci 
delicti. Id. at 1420. 
70  See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332 (1934) (“The law of the place 
of contracting determines the validity and effect of a promise . . . .”).  This rule is also 
known as lex loci contractus. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Roach, 945 So. 2d 
1160, 1163 (Fla. 2006) (stating that the rule of lex loci contractus “provides that the law 
of the jurisdiction where the contract was executed governs the rights and liabilities of the 
parties . . . .”). See generally E.H. Schopler, What Law Governs in Determining Whether 
Facts and Circumstances Operate to Terminate, Breach, Rescind, or Repudiate a Con-
tract, 50 A.L.R.2d 254 (2008). 
71  See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 358 (1934) (“The duty for the 
performance of which a party to a contract is bound will be discharged by compliance 
with the law of the place of performance . . . .”). 
72  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971) (“The rights and 
liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of 
the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the oc-
currence and the parties . . . .”); see also First Trust N.A. v. Moses & Singer, No. 99 Civ. 
1947, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10957, at *10–18 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2000) (applying Mis-
sissippi “most significant relationship” choice of law methodology to a legal malpractice 
claim); Ena, supra note 69, at 1428–30 (discussing application of the modern “most sig-
nificant relationship” choice of law methodology in tort cases). 
73  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 186–88 (1971) (“Issues in 
contract are determined by the law chosen by the parties . . . ,” otherwise “[t]he rights and 
duties of the parties with respect to an issue in contract are determined by the local law of 
the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the 
transaction and the parties . . . .”); see also Hill, Van Santen, Steadman & Simpson, P.C. 
v. Axxess Entry Techs., Inc., No. 90 C 3854, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 485, at *3–5 (N.D. 
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states, however, the applicable choice of law methodology depends 
on the court’s characterization of the action.  For example, Florida 
uses the traditional rule in contract cases74 and the modern “most 
significant relationship” methodology in tort cases.75  Therefore, 
the court’s choice of law decision may depend on whether a mal-
practice claim sounds in tort or in contract. 
C. Proving Causation and Damages:“Case Within a Case” and 
Related Jurisdictional Issues 
Most of malpractice claims against patent practitioners arise 
from missed filing dates, breaches of fiduciary duty, and errors in 
litigation.76  Legal malpractice claims involving substantive errors 
in patent work are relatively rare.77  Although the technical sophis-
tication of the patent law practice increases chances for attorney 
mistakes, only in a few reported instances have clients realized or 
proven that their patent attorneys made a substantive error and that 
the error was a proximate cause of the client’s damages.78  Patent 
prosecution errors usually surface during subsequent patent in-
fringement litigation or licensing negotiations.79  By that time, a 
 
Ill. Jan. 19, 1993) (applying Illinois’s “most significant relationship” choice of law meth-
odology to tort and contract legal malpractice counterclaims of a former client against its 
attorneys); Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2006:  
Nineteenth Annual Survey, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 697, 713 (2006) (reporting that by 2006, 
only ten U.S. states still adhered to the traditional choice of law rule in tort cases, and 
only twelve states applied it in contract cases). 
74  See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 945 So. 2d at 1163–64 (reaffirming Florida’s 
adherence to the traditional choice of law rule in contract cases). 
75  See Bishop v. Fla. Specialty Paint Co., 389 So. 2d 999, 1001 (Fla. 1980) (adopting 
the “most significant relationship” approach of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of 
Laws for tort cases). 
76  3 MALLEN & SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 2, § 24:24; see also Mark 
Hancock, Malpractice Cases Based on a Missed Patent Filing (June 15, 2006), 
http://www.sdma.com/Publications/detail.aspx?pub=4405. 
77  3 MALLEN & SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 2, § 24:24. 
78  Oddi, Patent Attorney Malpractice, supra note 4, at 2–3. 
79  See, e.g., Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, 
504 F.3d 1262, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (clients discovered errors in patent prosecution dur-
ing subsequent patent infringement litigation); Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jawor-
ski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (clients discovered errors in patent prose-
cution during subsequent licensing negotiations).  See infra Part III for a detailed 
discussion of these two cases. 
VOL19_BOOK1_ENA 12/3/2008  12:16:06 PM 
232 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 19:219 
                                                          
legal malpractice action may be barred by the statute of limita-
tions.80 
To adjudicate a malpractice claim, the court has to evaluate the 
underlying action or transaction that gave rise to the malpractice 
claim.81  The most common approach is to implement the “case 
within a case” concept where the outcome of the legal malpractice 
action depends on the outcome of the underlying case that was 
never tried or was not tried properly because of the alleged mal-
practice.82  Effectively, the court re-tries the underlying case as a 
part of the malpractice action to determine if the malpractice plain-
tiff would have been successful or “what should have happened” 
but for the attorney’s malpractice.83 
For example, in U.S. Cosmetics Corp. v. Greenberg Traurig, 
LLP,84 the plaintiffs alleged that Greenberg Traurig, LLP improp-
erly entered into an unauthorized settlement while representing the 
plaintiffs in a patent infringement action.85  The court found that 
the plaintiffs failed to show that they complied with the require-
ment of 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) to consistently mark substantially all of 
the patented product by printing the word “patent” or “pat.” and 
80  See, e.g., Immunocept, 504 F.3d at 1289 (holding that the legal malpractice action 
was barred by the statute of limitations). 
81  See 4 MALLEN & SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 2, § 34:11. 
82  For a detailed discussion of the concept of a “case within a case,” often referred to as 
a “trial within a trial” or “lawsuit within a lawsuit,” see 4 MALLEN & SMITH, LEGAL 
MALPRACTICE, supra note 2, § 34:11–:12; John H. Bauman, Damages for Legal Malprac-
tice:  An Appraisal of the Crumbling Dike and the Threatening Flood, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 
1127, 1129–30 (1988) [hereinafter Bauman, Damages for Legal Malpractice]; Seymore, 
The Competency of State Courts, supra note 5, at 455–58; see also Katsaris v. Scelsi, 453 
N.Y.S.2d 994, 996 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982) (“A legal malpractice action may be described as 
a ‘lawsuit within a lawsuit.’  A plaintiff must prove the attorney failed to exercise reason-
able care, and also that the plaintiff would have been successful in the underlying action 
if the attorney had performed properly.” (citing Parksville Mobile Modular, Inc. v. Fabri-
cant, 422 N.Y.S.2d 710, 716 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979))). 
83  See, e.g., Ocean Ships, Inc. v. Stiles, 315 F.3d 111, 119 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Where mal-
practice is shown to have affected the proceedings, the inquiry shifts to what would have 
happened if the claim had been decided in the absence of malpractice.”).  For a detailed 
discussion, see 4 MALLEN & SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 2, § 34:11–:12. 
84  U.S. Cosmetics Corp. v. Greenberg Traurig, LLP, No. 04-CV-3697, 2007 WL 
980148 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2007). 
85  Id. at *1. 
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the number of the patent on it.86  Since the plaintiffs did not show 
that they would have prevailed or reached a better settlement in the 
underlying infringement action but for the law firm’s alleged neg-
ligence, the court granted a summary judgment for the defendant 
law firm.87 
Courts have held that to recover in a malpractice case, the 
plaintiff must prove actual damages resulted from the alleged mal-
practice.88  For example, in Sherwood Group, Inc. v. Dornbush, 
Mensch, Mandelstam & Silverman,89 the court granted summary 
judgment to the defendant law firm since plaintiff’s allegations of 
damages were highly speculative, and the plaintiff failed to show 
any actual damages.90 
In a patent prosecution context, a malpractice plaintiff has to 
show that a patent with a certain commercial value would have is-
sued or that the issued patent would have been more valuable but 
for the alleged malpractice.91  In Igen, Inc. v. White,92 where the 
plaintiff alleged that it suffered $150 million in damages because 
the defendant patent law firm negligently failed to timely file a 
patent application in Europe, a New York appellate court dis-
missed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action since the 
plaintiff could not show any actual harm.93 
In a more recent case, the same court held that the trier of fact 
could find a diminution of value of a worldwide license to manu-
facture, sell, and sublicense a patented pharmaceutical product 
86  Id. at *2–4 (explaining that to satisfy the constructive notice provision of 35 U.S.C. § 
287(a), the patentee must show that substantially all of the patented product being dis-
tributed was marked and the marking was substantially consistent and continuous (citing 
Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1998))). 
87  Id. at *5. 
88  3 MALLEN & SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 2, § 24:24. 
89  Sherwood Group, Inc. v. Dornbush, Mensch, Mandelstam & Silverman, 594 
N.Y.S.2d 766 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993). 
90  Id. at 768. 
91  See, e.g., Oddi, Patent Attorney Malpractice, supra note 4, at 44–45. 
92  Igen, Inc. v. White, 672 N.Y.S.2d 867 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). 
93  Id. at 869.  The court noted: “Plaintiff, the inventor of a technique for producing 
monoclonal antibodies, seeks to wrest from its former counsel something that, thus far, 
has eluded it in the marketplace—a monetary return from its patented process.” Id. at 
868. 
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where the defendant law firm failed to timely file a patent applica-
tion in Asia.94 
In Kairos Scientific Inc. v. Fish & Richardson, P.C.,95 decided 
under California law, the plaintiff managed to show that defendant 
law firm’s negligent failure to timely file a Patent Cooperation 
Treaty (“PCT”) application caused the plaintiff thirty million dol-
lars in damages, mostly in licensing fees and royalties, because the 
issued patent provided protection only in Canada and the United 
States.96 
In addition to proving a favorable judgment in the underlying 
case, the court may require a malpractice plaintiff to show that the 
judgment would have been collectible97 and no other remedies re-
mained available against the underlying defendant.98  For example, 
in Garretson v. Harold I. Miller,99 a California appellate court af-
firmed a judgment for the defendant attorney in a legal malpractice 
case where the plaintiff client failed to establish that a favorable 
judgment in the underlying case would have been collectible.100 
The outcome of a “case within a case” in a patent-related legal 
malpractice action may turn on a substantial issue of patent law, 
which inevitably raises jurisdictional questions related to the con-
gressional grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction over patent 
claims.101  For example, in Vaxiion Therapeutics, Inc. v. Foley & 
Lardner LLP,102 the plaintiff, Vaxiion Therapeutics, Inc. 
(“Vaxiion”), alleged that Foley & Lardner (“Foley”) attorneys, 
94  InKine Pharm. Co. v. Coleman, 759 N.Y.S.2d 62, 63 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003). 
95  Kairos Scientific Inc. v. Fish & Richardson, P.C., No. 415736, 2003 WL 21960687 
(Cal. Super. Ct. July 29, 2003), aff’d, Nos. A107085 & A107486, 2006 WL 171921 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2006) (reducing the award by 1.3 million dollars and affirming the 
modified judgment). 
96  Id. at *19–20, *77. 
97  For a detailed discussion of the requirement of collectibility, see Bauman, Damages 
for Legal Malpractice, supra note 82, at 1135–38. 
98  Id. at 1138–40.  
99  Garretson v. Harold I. Miller, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 317 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
100  Id. at 326.  “California follows the majority rule that a malpractice plaintiff must 
prove not only negligence on the part of his or her attorney but that careful management 
of the case-within-a-case would have resulted in a favorable judgment ‘and collection of 
same.’” Id. at 321 (citing Campbell v. Magana, 8 Cal. Rptr. 32, 33 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960)). 
101  See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006). 
102  Vaxiion Therapeutics, Inc. v. Foley & Lardner LLP, No. 07CV280, 2008 WL 
538446 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2008). 
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who prosecuted Vaxiion’s patent application, after filing a provi-
sional application in the United States on May 24, 2001, failed to 
timely file an international application under the PCT.103  Accord-
ing to Vaxiion, the filing deadline for the PCT application was 
May 24, 2002, the day before the Memorial Day weekend.104  
Foley & Lardner filed the PCT application on the next business 
day, May 28, 2002.105  Therefore, Vaxiion could only claim prior-
ity from a revised provisional application filed nine months 
later.106  Meanwhile, unbeknownst to Vaxiion, another group of 
Foley & Lardner attorneys filed United States and PCT patent ap-
plications for EnGene, a Vaxiion competitor.107  Vaxiion claimed 
that the competitor’s applications covered the same intellectual 
property as one of its divisional patent applications, and thus, lim-
ited Vaxiion’s patent protection to the United States.108 
Foley argued that to prove causation and damages, Vaxiion had 
to show that a valid, enforceable, and more valuable international 
patent would have issued had the application been filed timely.109  
Defendants also claimed that the court had to conduct an interfer-
ence proceeding with regards to the claim scope, patentability, and 
priority of the competing patent applications to determine whether 
EnGene’s and Vaxiion’s patent applications cover the same subject 
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 291 and § 135.110  Therefore, according 
to Foley, the outcome of the “case within a case” depended on sub-
stantial issues of patent law, and the federal district court had sub-
ject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the case despite the absence of 
103  Id. at *1. 
104  See id.; Defendant Foley & Lardner LLP’s Opposition to Plaintiff Vaxiion Therapeu-
tics, Inc.’s Motion to Remand at 2, Vaxiion Therapeutics, 2008 WL 538446 (No. 
07CV280), 2007 WL 4596888 [hereinafter Foley’s Opposition to the Motion to Re-
mand]. 
105  Foley’s Opposition to the Motion to Remand, supra note 104, at 2. 
106  See Notice of Motion for Remand at 2, Vaxiion Therapeutics, 2008 WL 538446 (No. 
07CV280), 2007 WL 4597081 [hereinafter Vaxiion’s Motion for Remand].  Vaxiion 
learned of EnGene’s patent applications when EnGene offered Vaxiion a cross-licensing 
agreement. Id. at 2–3. 
107  See Vaxiion’s Motion for Remand, supra note 106, at 2–3. 
108  See Foley’s Opposition to the Motion to Remand, supra note 104, at 2.  Vaxiion had 
to split its original patent application into twenty-three divisional applications because of 
a restriction requirement. See Vaxiion Therapeutics, 2008 WL 538446, at *1. 
109  See Foley’s Opposition to the Motion to Remand, supra note 104, at 5. 
110  Id. at 6–9. 
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diversity between the parties.111  The court agreed with the defen-
dants and held that it had jurisdiction to hear the case.112 
Although there are good arguments in favor of exclusive fed-
eral jurisdiction over such malpractice actions under 28 U.S.C. § 
1338,113 as discussed in Part II, until recently, federal courts de-
clined jurisdiction in such cases in the absence of diversity of citi-
zenship between the parties.  Part II also provides a background for 
the Part III analysis of recent Federal Circuit decisions in Air 
Measurement Technologies114 and Immunocept.115 
II. FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PATENT LAW MALPRACTICE CASES 
A. Jurisdiction of Federal Courts 
Subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts is based on a fed-
eral subject matter116 or diversity of citizenship.117  It derives from 
Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, which delineates the 
outer limits of federal subject matter jurisdiction.118  Congress 
adopted enabling statutes that define actual jurisdiction of federal 
courts.119  Therefore, subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts 
111  Id. at 9. 
112  See generally Vaxiion Therapeutics, 2008 WL 538446.  For a further discussion of 
this case, see infra notes 189–96 and accompanying text . 
113  See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006). 
114  Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, 504 F.3d 
1262 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
115   Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
116  See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil 
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”). 
117  See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all 
civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclu-
sive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States . . . .”); see also 
1-1 FEDERAL LITIGATION GUIDE § 1.05 (Lexis 2007) (discussing constitutional and statu-
tory basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction). 
118  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94 (1968) (“The juris-
diction of federal courts is defined and limited by Article III of the Constitution.”). 
119  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330–69, 1441–53; Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 538 (1974) 
(noting that federal subject matter “[j]urisdiction is essentially the authority conferred by 
Congress to decide a given type of case . . . .”). 
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cannot be extended through judicial interpretation, state laws and 
regulations, or by consent of the parties.120 
The Supreme Court interpreted the “arising under” language of 
§ 1331 to confer narrower jurisdiction on federal courts than the 
identical “arising under” language of Article III of the Constitu-
tion.121  For a claim to arise “under the Constitution, laws, or trea-
ties of the United States,” the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint 
must be based on a cause of action created by federal law or the re-
lief sought must necessarily depend on a resolution of a substantial 
question of federal law.122  Plaintiffs cannot defeat or confer fed-
eral jurisdiction though the drafting of artful pleadings.123 
Generally, state law-based actions, such as legal malpractice 
cases, with the requisite amount in controversy and diverse parties, 
are within concurrent jurisdiction of state and federal courts.124  
With a few exceptions, if filed in a state court, defendants may re-
move such cases to federal district courts under 28 U.S.C. § 
1441.125 
If a federal court has proper original jurisdiction over a civil 
case, it has supplemental jurisdiction over all state law claims aris-
120  See, e.g., Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17–18 (1951) (“The jurisdiction 
of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation or 
by prior action or consent of the parties.”). 
121  See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 494–95 (1983) (“Although the 
language of § 1331 parallels that of the ‘Arising Under’ Clause of Art. III, this Court 
never has held that statutory ‘arising under’ jurisdiction is identical to Art. III ‘arising 
under’ jurisdiction.  Quite the contrary is true.”). 
122  See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 415 U.S. 125, 127–28 (1974); see also 
Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986) (holding that “the 
question whether a claim ‘arises under’ federal law must be determined by reference to 
the ‘well-pleaded complaint’” and that “[a] defense that raises a federal question is in-
adequate to confer federal jurisdiction”). 
123  See Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 397 (1981) (“[C]ourts ‘will 
not permit plaintiff to use artful pleading to close off defendant’s right to a federal forum 
. . . [and] occasionally the removal court will seek to determine whether the real nature of 
the claim is federal, regardless of plaintiff’s characterization.’” (quoting 14 CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3722 (1976))). 
124  See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a)(1) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all 
civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclu-
sive of interest and costs, and is between citizens of different States . . . .”). 
125  See 28 U.S.C. § 1441.  Nonremovable actions are listed in 28 U.S.C. § 1445 and are 
not relevant in the legal malpractice context. 
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ing from the same case or controversy.126  The court, however, 
may decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over a par-
ticular claim.127 
Some types of claims, such as those arising under patent laws, 
are within exclusive original jurisdiction of federal courts, and 
state courts lack jurisdiction to hear such matters.128 
B. Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule and Federal Jurisdiction in 
Patent Cases 
In 1982, to ensure uniformity in the development and applica-
tion of patent law, Congress created the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit.129  The Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate 
jurisdiction over any final decision of a federal district court where 
the court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1338, over ap-
peals from decisions of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interfer-
ences (“BPAI”), and over appeals from district court decisions on 
appeals from BPAI decisions.130 
126  See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).  The statute provides:  
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly pro-
vided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the 
district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have 
supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to 
claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form 
part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United 
States Constitution. 
Id. 
127  See 28 U.S.C.. § 1367(c).  The statute provides:  
The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over a claim under subsection (a) if—(1) the claim raises a novel or 
complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates 
over the claim or claims over which the district court has original ju-
risdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it 
has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there 
are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. 
Id. 
128  See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). 
129  Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982). 
130  See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1), (4). 
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Congress intended to circumscribe clearly the appellate juris-
diction of the Federal Circuit by the reference to § 1338.131  In 
practice, however, this created two jurisdictional conflicts, one be-
tween the Federal Circuit and state courts and the other one be-
tween the Federal Circuit and other circuit courts.132  The Supreme 
Court attempted to clarify the issue in Christianson v. Colt Indus-
tries Operating Corp.133  Applying the well-pleaded complaint rule 
that it used to interpret the scope of federal jurisdiction under Sec-
tion 1331, the Court held: 
[Section] 1338(a) jurisdiction [of the Federal Cir-
cuit] likewise extend[s] only to those cases in which 
a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that fed-
eral patent law creates the cause of action or that the 
plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on 
resolution of a substantial question of federal patent 
law, in that patent law is a necessary element of one 
of the well-pleaded claims.134 
The Court also explained that if several alternative theories 
support a claim, there is no federal patent law jurisdiction unless a 
patent law question is essential for each of the theories.135 
Concerned that the Federal Circuit interpreted its “arising un-
der” jurisdiction and the well-pleaded complaint rule too 
broadly,136 in Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys-
131  See Emmette F. Hale, III, The “Arising Under” Jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit:  
An Opportunity for Uniformity in Patent Law, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 229, 238–41 
(1986). 
132  In a jurisdictional conflict between the Federal Circuit and a state court, the court has 
to determine whether a particular claim falls under the exclusive jurisdictional grant of 28 
U.S.C. § 1338.  In a jurisdictional conflict that implicates appellate jurisdiction of the 
Federal Circuit and a regional circuit court, the court has to decide whether the district 
court where the appeal originated from had original subject matter jurisdiction under § 
1338 or under some other source of federal jurisdiction.  For a detailed treatment of these 
issues, see John Donofrio & Edward C. Donovan, Christianson v. Colt Industries Operat-
ing Corp.:  The Application of Federal Question Precedent to Federal Circuit Jurisdic-
tion Decisions, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1835 (1996) [hereinafter Donofrio & Donovan, The 
Application of Federal Question Precedent]. 
133  Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988). 
134  Id. at 808–09. 
135  Id. at 810. 
136  For a theoretical basis for such an interpretation, see, for example, Donofrio & 
Donovan, The Application of Federal Question Precedent, supra note 132. 
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tems, Inc.,137 the Supreme Court held that the well-pleaded com-
plaint rule does not allow a counterclaim for patent infringement to 
serve as a basis for the exclusive appellate jurisdiction under § 
1295(a)(1).138  The Court was concerned that a broad interpretation 
of the “arising under” jurisdiction would destroy a plaintiff’s con-
trol over removal jurisdiction and the appellate forum for the claim 
and would unnecessarily complicate the application of the well-
pleaded complaint doctrine.139 
One of the consequences of the Holmes decision is that re-
gional circuits and state courts have to decide more patent law 
claims.  Some commentators expressed concern that this may have 
a negative impact on the uniformity in the application of patent 
law—the same concern that led to the creation of the Federal Cir-
cuit.140 
Three years later, in Grable and Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. 
Darue Engineering and Manufacturing,141 the Supreme Court cau-
tioned that “[a] federal issue will ultimately qualify for a federal 
forum only if federal jurisdiction is consistent with congressional 
judgment about the sound division of labor between state and fed-
eral courts . . . .”142  According to the Court, “federal jurisdiction 
demands not only a contested federal issue, but a substantial one, 
indicating a serious federal interest in claiming the advantages 
thought to be inherent in a federal forum.”143  Thus, to determine 
existence of federal “arising under” jurisdiction, courts have to an-
swer the following question: “[D]oes a state-law claim necessarily 
raise a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which 
a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congression-
137  Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002). 
138  Id. at 830–31. 
139  Id. at 831–32. 
140  See, e.g., C.J. Alice Chen, Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, 
Inc., 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 141, 157 (2003); Christopher A. Cotropia, Counterclaims, 
the Well-Pleaded Complaint, and Federal Jurisdiction, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 50 (2004); 
Christopher A. Cotropia, “Arising Under” Jurisdiction and Uniformity in Patent Law, 9 
MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 253, 311 (2003). 
141  Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005). 
142  Id. at 313. 
143  Id. 
VOL19_BOOK1_ENA 12/3/2008  12:16:06 PM 
2008] JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES IN PATENT MALPRACTICE 241 
                                                          
ally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibili-
ties?”144 
The federal jurisdictional framework discussed in this section 
informed federal and state court jurisdictional rulings examined be-
low and formed the basis for the two Federal Circuit decisions dis-
cussed in Part III. 
C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Patent Law Malpractice 
Cases Before the Federal Circuit Decisions in Air 
Measurement145 and Immunocept146 
Traditionally, federal courts found no jurisdiction in legal mal-
practice cases absent diversity of citizenship.147  As discussed in 
Part I, the outcome of some patent law malpractice cases may de-
pend on a substantial question of patent law.  Nevertheless, since 
such cases arise under state law, in compliance with the well-
pleaded complaint rule and the Supreme Court decisions in 
Christianson and Holmes, in the absence of diversity, federal 
courts declined jurisdiction over patent law malpractice claims.148 
For example, in Adamasu v. Gifford, Krass, Groh, Sprinkle, 
Anderson & Citkowski, P.C.,149 where the plaintiff sued patent at-
torneys in a state court for the alleged legal malpractice in patent 
prosecution, the defendants did not succeed in their attempt to re-
move the case to a federal court.150  The prosecution history of the 
patent in question was long and involved several continuation, con-
144  Id. at 314. 
145  Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, 504 F.3d 
1262 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
146  Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
147  See, e.g., Commonwealth Film Processing, Inc. v. Moss & Rocovich, P.C., 778 F. 
Supp. 283 (W.D. Va. 1991) (no federal jurisdiction in a legal malpractice action against 
patent attorney who allegedly failed to demonstrate adequate knowledge of patent law); 
Voight v. Kraft, 342 F. Supp. 821 (D. Idaho 1972) (no federal jurisdiction in a legal mal-
practice action where the defendant attorneys allegedly advised the plaintiff to pursue a 
patent for a device that was not patentable). 
148  See supra Part II.B for a discussion of the well-pleaded complaint rule and the Su-
preme Court decisions in Christianson and Holmes. 
149  Adamasu v. Gifford, Krass, Groh, Sprinkle, Anderson & Citkowski, P.C., No. 05-
70389, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37769 (E.D. Mich. July 25, 2005). 
150  Id. at *11. 
VOL19_BOOK1_ENA 12/3/2008  12:16:06 PM 
242 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 19:219 
                                                          
tinuation in part, and divisional applications.151  The plaintiff filed 
the original patent application in November 1982.152  In an attempt 
to qualify for a patent duration of seventeen years from the date of 
issue and effectively extend the life of the patent, on June 7, 1995, 
the plaintiff filed a patent application that claimed priority from his 
November 1982 application.153  In December 1996, the PTO re-
jected the new application and seven months later declared the ap-
plication abandoned for failure to respond to the rejection.154  In 
2000, the plaintiff retained the defendant attorneys to revive the 
1995 patent application.155  The defendants filed a petition for re-
vival under 37 C.F.R. § 1.137(b), requisite terminal disclaimer, and 
a Continued Prosecution Application Request Transmittal under 37 
C.F.R. § 1.53(d).156  The PTO granted the petition to revive “solely 
for the purposes of continuity” and deemed the 1995 application 
abandoned in favor of the continued prosecution application filed 
in 2000.157  As a result, according to the plaintiff, the patent that 
issued in 2001 had the duration of twenty years from the date of 
filing of his earliest application in 1982.158  The plaintiff also 
151  See U.S. Patent No. 6,314,368, at [62] (filed June 7, 1995). 
152  Id. at [62]. 
153  Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 154(c)(1) (2006) (“[T]he term of a patent . . . that results 
from an application filed [before June 8, 1995] shall be the greater of the 20-year term 
[from the filing of the original application], or 17 years from grant, subject to any termi-
nal disclaimers.”).  The June 8, 1995, deadline resulted from the United States acceding 
to the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPs”) Agreement in 
1994, which required that “[t]he term of [patent] protection available shall not end before 
the expiration of a period of twenty years counted from the filing date.” Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 33, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 229, 33 I.L.M. 1197, available at http://www.wto.org/English/docs_e/legal_e/ 
27-trips.pdf; see also Uruguay Round Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 531, 108 
Stat. 4809, 4973–90 (1994). For a discussion of the TRIPs Agreement and its effect on 
U.S. patent law, see, for example, Kenneth J. Burchfiel, U.S. GATT Legislation Changes 
Patent Term, 77 J. PAT & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 222 (1995); Charles E. Van Horn, Ef-
fects of GATT and NAFTA on PTO Practice, 77 J. PAT & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 231 
(1995). 
154  Adamasu, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37769, at *3. 
155  Id. at *3–4. 
156  Id. at *4. 
157  Id. 
158  Id. at *5; see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.137(d)(2) (2007) (“Any terminal disclaimer pursuant 
to paragraph (d)(1) of this section must also apply to any patent granted on a continuing 
utility or plant application filed before June 8, 1995 . . . that contains a specific reference 
under 35 U.S.C. 120, 121, or 365(c) to the application for which revival is sought.”). 
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claimed that defendants’ filing of the continued prosecution appli-
cation was an error that shortened the patent term and resulted in a 
loss of over five million dollars in royalties and licensing fees.159 
The defendants filed a notice of removal with the U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, arguing that the court 
had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338 because the 
plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily required determination of the 
scope of the claims in his patent.160  According to the defendants, 
to prove causation and damages, the plaintiff had to show that “any 
company that would have paid him royalties or licensing fees 
[was] selling or ha[d] sold a product that infringed his patent.”161  
Applying the well-pleaded complaint rule, the court treated the 
case as a state tort action that did not arise under patent laws and 
granted plaintiff’s motion to remand the case to a state court.162 
State courts reached similar conclusions even in cases that ar-
guably turned on substantial issues of patent law.  For example, in 
New Tek Manufacturing, Inc. v. Beehner,163 the Supreme Court of 
Nebraska reviewed an appeal from a summary judgment for the 
defendant patent attorney John A. Beehner (“Beehner”) in a legal 
malpractice action.164  To render a decision, the state district court, 
as a part of “case within a case” proceedings, held an elaborate 
Markman hearing165 on claim construction to determine whether 
the plaintiff would have been successful in a hypothetical in-
fringement action but for the attorney’s professional negligence.166  
Since the plaintiff asserted a state law cause of action and sought 
159  Id. at *5. 
160  Id. at *6. 
161  Id. 
162  Id. at *8–11.  “The complaint alleges one cause of action, namely legal malpractice, 
which is a state-law tort claim.” Id. at *9.  It is likely that defendants’ handling of their 
notice to remove contributed to the court’s decision.  As the court pointed out, the defen-
dants failed to file “a copy of all process with the notice of removal” in compliance with 
28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), their notice of removal contained typographical errors in citations 
and did not follow court’s motion practice guidelines. Id. at *6–7.  In addition, defen-
dants’ filing of a sur-reply did not follow the court’s local rules. Id. at *7. 
163  New Tek Mfg., Inc. v. Beehner (New Tek), 702 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 2005). 
164  Id. at 342. 
165  See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996) (holding that 
claim construction “is exclusively within the province of the court.”). 
166  New Tek, 702 N.W.2d at 346. 
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remedies under state law, the Supreme Court of Nebraska found no 
basis for federal jurisdiction and held that patent law questions 
were merely incidental to the case.167  The state’s highest appellate 
court, however, disagreed with the state district court’s patent 
claim construction and reversed the summary judgment.168 
In Delta Process Equipment, Inc. v. New England Insurance 
Co.,169 the Court of Appeals of Louisiana found federal jurisdic-
tion under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) in a patent law malpractice case 
where the defendant attorney failed to timely file a patent applica-
tion, and the issued patent was therefore invalid because of the on-
sale statutory bar of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).170  Upon rehearing, how-
ever, the court reversed itself and held that under Christianson, the 
plaintiff’s right to relief did not “necessarily depend on resolution 
of a substantial question of federal patent law . . . .”171
In a few legal malpractice cases, federal courts denied plain-
tiffs’ motions to remand to state courts.  For example, in Chance v. 
Sullivan,172 clients sued their former attorneys in a state court al-
leging, inter alia, a breach of fiduciary duty and malpractice in 
reaching a settlement agreement in the underlying federal litiga-
tion.173  The defendants removed the malpractice action to the 
same federal district court where they litigated the underlying ac-
tion.174  The court denied plaintiffs’ motion to remand and held 
that it had federal question jurisdiction over the case because fed-
eral issues dominated the case and alternatively to protect the in-
tegrity of the court’s prior settlement order.175 
Within the last few years, courts’ treatment of patent law mal-
practice cases started to change.  In 2003, the U.S. District Court 
167  Id. 
168  Id. at 354–55.  The court refused to consider Beehner’s purported cross-appeal be-
yond the issue of subject matter jurisdiction because, in filing his cross-appeal, Beehner 
failed to comply with the requirements of NEB. CT. R. PRAC. 9D(4) (2001). 
169  Delta Process Equip., Inc. v. New England Ins. Co., 560 So. 2d 923 (La. Ct. App. 
1990). 
170  See id. at 923–24; see also 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). 
171  Delta Process, 560 So. 2d at 926 (citing Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 
486 U.S. 800 (1988)). 
172  Chance v. Sullivan, 993 F. Supp. 565 (S.D. Tex. 1998). 
173  Id. at 567. 
174  Id. at 566. 
175  Id. at 568. 
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for the Western District of Texas denied plaintiff’s motion to re-
mand a patent law malpractice action to the state court where the 
plaintiffs originally filed it.176  The plaintiffs alleged that one of 
the defendants, Gary Hamilton, failed to timely file a patent appli-
cation and did not properly disclose relevant prior art to the PTO 
while prosecuting patent applications for the plaintiffs.177  This 
malfeasance, according to the plaintiffs, forced them to settle the 
subsequent infringement litigation for significantly less than would 
have been otherwise possible.178 
The court held that in order to prevail, the plaintiffs had to es-
tablish that they would have prevailed in the underlying infringe-
ment action, but for Hamilton’s negligence that afforded the al-
leged infringers the defenses of on-sale bar and patent 
invalidity.179  Thus, according to the court, the plaintiffs’ right to 
relief “necessarily depend[ed] on resolution of a substantial ques-
tion of federal patent law . . . .”180  In denying plaintiffs’ motion to 
remand, the court distinguished Commonwealth Film Process-
ing181 and Voight182 as cases where the parties conceded all sub-
stantial patent law 183
In 2005, another federal district court in Texas, without men-
tioning the Air Measurement decision, denied a motion to remand 
a patent law malpractice case to a state court.  In Groteapproach, 
Ltd. v. Reynolds,184 the U.S. District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Texas found that it had subject matter jurisdiction to hear 
the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) and the well-pleaded complaint 
176  See Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Hamilton, No. SA-03-CA-0541, 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 16391, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 5, 2003).  For the subsequent appellate history of 
this case, see infra Part III.A. 
177  Id. at *2. 
178  Id. at *2–3. 
179  Id. at *12–13. 
180  Id. at *13 (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 809 
(1988)). 
181  Commonwealth Film Processing, Inc. v. Moss & Rocovich, P.C., 778 F. Supp. 283 
(W.D. Va. 1991); see also supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
182  Voight v. Kraft, 342 F. Supp. 821 (D. Idaho 1972); see also supra note 147 and ac-
companying text. 
183  Air Measurement, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16391, at *10–12.  
184  Groteapproach, Ltd. v. Reynolds, No. 3:04-CV-2735-BF, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
16362, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug 9, 2005). 
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rule of Christianson.185  The plaintiff, Groteapproach, Ltd., alleged 
that the defendant attorney negligently missed a filing deadline for 
a patent application.186  The court reasoned that in order to prevail, 
the plaintiff “must necessarily prove that it possessed something 
patentable, and also that the deadline under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) was 
missed.”187  Therefore, the success of the plaintiff’s malpractice 
claim necessarily depended “on a resolution of substantial ques-
tions of federal patent law,” and the court had “arising under” ju-
risdiction over the case.188 
In February of 2007, the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of California also had to consider plaintiff’s motion to re-
mand a patent law malpractice case to a state court.189  The plain-
tiff in Vaxiion Therapeutics, Inc. v. Foley & Lardner LLP190 sued 
its former attorneys alleging negligence, dual representation of ad-
verse interests, breach of contract, interference with prospective 
economic advantage, and constructive fraud.191  Relying on district 
court decisions in Air Measurement and Groteapproach, the de-
fendant argued that the federal district court had subject matter ju-
risdiction to hear the case since its adjudication necessarily re-
quired “resolution of . . . substantial question[s] of federal patent 
law. . . .”192 
In support of its motion to remand, Vaxiion cited 1897 and 
1916 Supreme Court cases and claimed that the case only involved 
a breach of contract and “a matter of science” that did not impli-
185  Id. at *3 (citing Christianson, 486 U.S. at 808–09). 
186  Id. at *1. 
187  Id. at *3.  35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) provides:  “A person shall be entitled to a patent 
unless . . . the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a 
foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the 
date of the application for patent in the United States . . . .” 
188  Id. (quoting Christianson, 486 U.S. at 808–09). 
189  See Vaxiion’s Motion for Remand, supra note 106. 
190  Vaxiion Therapeutics, Inc. v. Foley & Lardner LLP, No. 07CV280-IEG, 2008 WL 
538446 (S.D. Cal. Feb, 27 2008); see also supra Part I.C (discussing this case). 
191  See Foley’s Opposition to the Motion to Remand, supra note 104, at 2. 
192  Id. at 3–9 (quoting Christianson, 486 U.S. at 808–9).  When the defendant removed 
the case to a federal court, Air Measurement and Groteapproach appeals were pending 
before the Federal Circuit. 
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cate federal patent law.193  Unable or unwilling to counter legal ar-
guments in the Air Measurement and Groteapproach decisions, 
Vaxiion moved to strike defendant’s citation of those two cases as 
not published, and thus, not citable in the Ninth Circuit.194 
Judge Irma E. Gonzalez agreed with the defendants, and on 
April 12, 2007, denied Vaxiion’s motions.195  As of the time of this 
writing, the case is still pending before the U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of California.196 
Cases discussed in this section show that, in the absence of 
clear rules defining outer limits of federal subject matter jurisdic-
tion, courts had to rely on general guidelines of Supreme Court 
cases and persuasive authority of their sister courts’ decisions.197  
To provide guidance on jurisdictional issues, the Federal Circuit 
accepted jurisdiction over appeals from district court decisions in 
two legal malpractice cases against patent attorneys where the dis-
trict courts asserted “arising under” jurisdiction over state ac-
tions.198  The final part of the Comment discusses those two cases. 
193  See Vaxiion’s Motion for Remand, supra note 106, at 3–4; Plaintiff’s Reply in Sup-
port of Motion to Remand at 2–3, Vaxiion Therapeutics, 2008 WL 538446 (No. 
07CV280), 2007 WL 4597055.   
194  Plaintiff’s Reply in Support of Motion to Strike at 2–3, Vaxiion Therapeutics, 2008 
WL 538446 (No. 07CV280), 2007 WL 4597078.  Apparently, Vaxiion’s counsel could 
not even find Air Measurement and Groteapproach decisions until Foley’s counsel pro-
vided copies of the two decisions. See Defendant Foley & Lardner LLP’s Opposition to 
Plaintiff Vaxiion Therapeutics, Inc.’s Motion to Strike at 2 n.1, Vaxiion Therapeutics, 
2008 WL 538446 (No. 07CV280), 2007 WL 4597084.  
195  See Vaxiion Therapeutics, 2008 WL 538446, at *2. 
196  See Vaxiion Therapeutics, 2008 WL 538446, for docket information. 
197  See, e.g., Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, 
No. SA-03-CA-0541, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96914, at *10–14 (W.D. Tex. Sep, 29 
2006). 
198  See Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, 206 F. 
App’x 980, 980 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (granting permission to appeal). 
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III. EXCLUSIVE FEDERAL JURISDICTION OF PATENT LAW 
MALPRACTICE CASES: FEDERAL CIRCUIT DECISIONS IN AIR 
MEASUREMENT199 AND IMMUNOCEPT200 
A. Air Measurement Technologies, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss 
Hauer & Feld, LLP 
On October 15, 2007, the Federal Circuit decided two cases 
where it held that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over 
state law legal malpractice cases that necessarily depend on a reso-
lution of a substantial question of federal patent law.201 
In Air Measurement, discussed in the previous section, after 
two years of discovery, the defendants, who originally removed the 
case to the federal court, filed a motion to remand.202  The plain-
tiffs, Air Measurement Technologies, Inc (“AMT”), opposed.203  
The court denied defendants’ motion to remand and granted its 
motion to permit interlocutory appeal to the Federal Circuit.204 
According to the district court, the controlling question of law 
on appeal was: “Whether a Texas state-law legal malpractice claim 
arising out of underlying patent prosecution and patent litigation 
necessarily raises a question of federal patent law, actually dis-
puted and substantial, that a federal forum may entertain without 
disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and 
state judicial responsibilities.”205  Granting the motion, the district 
court emphasized a lack of controlling authority on point, “the 
need for clarity in jurisdictional rules, and the amount of resources 
frequently required to litigate complex patent-related cases.”206 
The certified question presented an issue of first impression to 
the Federal Circuit.207  Writing for the court, Chief Judge Michel 
199  Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, 504 F.3d 
1262 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
200  Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
201  See id. at 1284; Air Measurement, 504 F.3d at 1265. 
202  Air Measurement, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96914, at *5. 
203  Id. 
204  Id. at *17. 
205  Id. at *16. 
206  Id. at *17. 
207  Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, 504 F.3d 
1262, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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started his analysis with the application of the well-pleaded com-
plaint rule of Christianson and Holmes.208  Since proof of patent 
infringement was necessary to show that AMT would have pre-
vailed in the underlying litigation but for the attorneys’ malprac-
tice, patent infringement was a necessary element of plaintiffs’ 
malpractice claim, and therefore, this presented “a substantial 
question of patent law conferring § 1338 jurisdiction.”209  Citing 
Grable, Judge Michel stated that it would be “illogical” for a dis-
trict court “to have jurisdiction under § 1338 to hear the underlying 
infringement suit and . . . not have jurisdiction under § 1338 to 
hear the same substantial patent question in the ‘case within a case’ 
context of a state malpractice claim.”210  This interpretation was 
consistent with post-Christianson Federal Circuit cases, where the 
court held that “patent infringement presents a substantial question 
of federal patent law conferring ‘arising under’ jurisdiction.”211 
To prevail in its “case within the case,” in addition to infringe-
ment, AMT had to show that it would have prevailed over the de-
fenses of patent invalidity and unenforceability in the underlying 
litigation but for its attorneys’ malpractice.212  This, according to 
Judge Michel, also presented a substantial question of federal pat-
ent law sufficient to confer “arising under” jurisdiction.213 
Turning to the federalism analysis under Grable, Judge Michel 
observed that “[t]here is a strong federal interest in the adjudication 
of patent infringement claims in federal court because patents are 
issued by a federal agency” and that litigants would “benefit from 
federal judges who have experience in claim construction and in-
fringement matters.”214  In adopting 28 U.S.C. § 1338, Congress 
decided the federal versus state jurisdictional issue in favor of en-
suring uniformity of federal patent law.215  Therefore, under 
Grable, patent infringement, being a necessary element of this le-
gal malpractice claim, presented a substantial issue of patent law 
208  Id. at 1267–69. 
209  Id. at 1269. 
210  Id. 
211  Id.  
212  Id. at 1270. 
213  Id. at 1273. 
214  Id. at 1272. 
215  See id. 
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sufficient to confer federal jurisdiction.216  In an apparent attempt 
to limit the scope of its holding, the court, in conclusion, stated: 
[W]e hold that at least where, as here, establishing 
patent infringement is a necessary element of a 
malpractice claim stemming from alleged mishan-
dling of patent prosecution and earlier patent litiga-
tion, the issue is substantial and contested, and fed-
eral resolution of the issue was intended by 
Congress, there is “arising under” jurisdiction under 
§ 1338.217 
B. Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP218 
In Immunocept, the plaintiffs (“Immunocept”) appealed from a 
summary judgment where the U.S. District Court for the Western 
District of Texas held that Immunocept’s legal malpractice claim 
was foreclosed by the Texas two-year statute of limitations and 
that the plaintiffs could not recover under Texas law because the 
alleged damages were too speculative.219  Immunocept claimed 
that Fulbright’s patent attorney, who prosecuted one of Immuno-
cept’s patents, erroneously used the restrictive “consists of” transi-
tional phrase instead of open-ended “comprises,” thus rendering 
the patent too narrow in scope and practically worthless.220  Im-
munocept appealed to the Federal Circuit, and the appellate court 
ordered both parties to address the issue of whether the district 
court had “arising under” jurisdiction over the malpractice claim 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1338( 221
In an opinion by Chief Judge Michel, the court stated that since 
claim drafting errors were the sole basis for the legal malpractice 
suit, they constituted an essential element of the malpractice cause 
of action.222  Therefore, Immunocept could not prevail without as-
216  See id. 
217  Id. 
218  Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, No. A-05-CA-334-SS, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 96912 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2006). 
219  Id. at *4. 
220  Id. at *3 (quoting Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 2). 
221  Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281, 1282–83 (Fed. Cir. 
2007). 
222  Id. at 1285. 
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certaining the scope of the patent claims.223  Further, since claim 
construction was a question of law that determined the scope of 
patent protection and could involve complex concepts of patent 
law, it represented a substantial question of federal law.224 
Relying on its holding in Air Measurement and applying simi-
lar analysis, the court held that where the “determination of claim 
scope is a necessary, substantial, and contested element of a mal-
practice claim stemming from patent prosecution, there is ‘arising 
under’ jurisdiction under § 1338.”225 
C. Patent Law Malpractice Cases After Air Measurement and 
Immunocept 
It is difficult to predict how courts will interpret the Federal 
Circuit decisions in Air Measurement and Immunocept and 
whether future cases will limit their effect.226  Some industry ob-
servers and practicing attorneys have expressed concerns that these 
decisions may lead to a wide variety of legal malpractice lawsuits, 
not only those that involve substantial questions of patent law, be-
ing tried in federal courts instead of state courts.227 
For example, E. Joshua Rosenkranz, who represented Akin 
Gump attorneys in the Air Measurement case and who argued the 
case before the Federal Circuit, believes that the Federal Circuit 
decision in Air Measurement “could lead to a deluge of state law 
legal malpractice suits being filed in federal courts.”228  Rosenk-
ranz even suggests that since there was federal jurisdiction in Air 
Measurement, then all patent malpractice cases, as well any other 
223  Id. 
224  Id. 
225  Id. at 1289. 
226  For some early comments on the two Federal Circuit decisions, see Hinshaw & Cul-
bertson LLP, Federal Circuit Finds Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction of Legal Malpractice 
Cases Arising From Patent Matters (Nov. 13, 2007), http://www.hinshawlaw.com 
/federal-circuit-finds-exclusive-federal-jurisdiction-of-legal-malpractice-cases-arising-
from-patent-matters-11-13-2007. 
227  See, e.g., Brenda Sapino Jeffreys & John Council, Federal Circuit: Legal-Mal Suits 
With Patent Infringement Elements Belong in Federal Court, TEX. LAWYER, Oct. 22, 
2007, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1192784614514. 
228  Id.  
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malpractice cases “in any matter involving a federal law or a fed-
eral agency” must be tried in federal courts.229 
In contrast, Paul Storm and Chris Kling, partners in the Dallas 
law firm Storm LLP who represented AMT in Air Measurement, 
do not believe that the Federal Circuit decision in Air Measurement 
will have broad implications.230  The holding in Air Measurement, 
according to Kling, requires a “fairly unique fact pattern” to keep a 
patent law malpractice lawsuit in a federal court.231 
Regardless of which predictions prove to be more accurate, 
there are important public policy reasons for the uniform develop-
ment and application of patent law.232  Discussing adjudication of 
patent-related matters in state courts, many commentators and aca-
demic writers expressed concerns about possible fragmentation of 
patent law and the competency of state courts to decide substantial 
patent-related issues—including legal malpractice cases that neces-
sarily turn on substantial questions of patent law.233  The Air 
Measurement and Immunocept decisions asserted exclusive federal 
jurisdiction over such cases. 
229  Id. 
230  Id. 
231  Id. 
232  See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 97-275, at 5 (1981), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15 
(expressing congressional intent to “increase doctrinal stability in the field of patent law” 
through the establishment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and to reduce or 
eliminate the widespread forum-shopping in the patent law area). 
233  See, e.g., Mark J. Henry, State Courts Hearing Patent Cases: A Cry for Help to the 
Federal Circuit, 101 DICK. L. REV. 41, 51 (1996) [hereinafter Henry, State Courts Hear-
ing Patent Cases] (reviewing a number of improperly decided state patent-related cases 
and arguing that state courts are incapable of adjudicating patent cases properly); Sey-
more, The Competency of State Courts, supra note 5, at 475 (arguing that legal malprac-
tice cases that necessarily turn on substantial issues of patent law should be tried in fed-
eral courts); Dutch D. Chung, Note, The Preclusive Effect of State Court Adjudication of 
Patent Issues and the Federal Courts’ Choice of Preclusion Laws, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 
707, 755 (2000) (warning that through artful pleading plaintiffs can avoid federal juris-
diction and that “potentially shaky interpretation of state court judges on patent issues 
will surely frustrate Congress’ intent to remove incentives for forum shopping that had 
plagued the nation prior to the creation of the [Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit]”). 
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Many commentators pointed out that complex patent cases pre-
sent substantial challenges to the courts.234  Federal courts are bet-
ter prepared to adjudicate questions of patent law, and their deci-
sions are subject to the appellate review by the Federal Circuit.235  
At the same time, there is no doubt that federal courts are compe-
tent and experienced in the adjudication of state law claims, in-
cluding state law claims arising from attorneys’ malfeasance that 
implicate laws of multiple states and pose complex choice of law 
issues.236 
Trying legal malpractice cases involving substantial questions 
of patent law in federal courts will serve the Congressional intent 
of bringing uniformity into the U.S. patent law jurisprudence.237  
In this respect, the two Federal Circuit decisions will alleviate, al-
beit in a limited way, the negative impact of the Supreme Court 
holding in Holmes on the consistent application of patent 238
Meanwhile, litigants in patent law malpractice cases have al-
ready started to take advantage of the Air Measurement and Immu-
nocept decisions.  Two days after the Federal Circuit rendered the 
decisions, defendants in Berger v. Seyfarth Shaw, LLP239 relied on 
them to remove their case to a federal court.240  In Berger, two in-
ventors of snowboard bindings alleged that their attorneys’ mis-
takes in patent prosecution and in subsequent patent infringement 
litigation caused them more than seventy five million dollars in 
damages.241 
234  See generally John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Taming Patent:  Six Steps for Surviving Scary 
Patent Cases, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1413 (2003) (explaining why trying complex patent 
cases may present substantial challenges to the courts). 
235  See, e.g., Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281, 1284 
(Fed. Cir. 2007). 
236  See supra Parts I.A and I.B for a discussion of how different states approach legal 
malpractice claims and related choice of law issues. 
237  See supra note 232. 
238  See supra Part II.B (discussion of the Holmes case). 
239  Berger v. Seyfarth Shaw, LLP, No. C 07-05279, 2008 WL 683425 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 
2008). 
240  Id. at *2; see also Zusha Elinson, $75 Million Suit Says Seyfarth Bungled IP Case, 
RECORDER, Oct. 22, 2007, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1192784618782 [here-
inafter Elinson, $75 Million Suit] (discussing Berger, 2008 WL 683425). 
241  Berger, 2008 WL 683425, at *1–2; see also Elinson, $75 Million Suit, supra note 
240. 
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In Chopra v. Townsend, Townsend and Crew LLP,242 the plain-
tiff filed a legal malpractice action against his patent attorneys in a 
federal district court and relied on Air Measurement and Immuno-
cept to show that the court had jurisdiction to hear the case.243  The 
plaintiff claimed that the attorneys “failed to respond to Office Ac-
tions from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, . . . 
abandoned his patent applications,” and thus, gave a plaintiff’s 
competitor an opportunity to obtain patents that cover the same 
technology.244 
Despite predictions that all patent-related legal malpractice 
cases will be tried in federal courts, some federal district courts re-
fused jurisdiction in such cases if all patent law issues had been re-
solved in the underlying actions.245  For example, in Taylor v. 
Kochanowski,246 the plaintiff alleged that his attorneys made pro-
cedural errors in his patent infringement case against Daimler 
Chrysler and one of its suppliers.247  The court emphasized that, in 
the underlying patent infringement action, the judge found as a 
matter of law that the patent in question was not infringed, and on 
appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision.248  Since no sub-
stantial questions of federal patent law remained at issue in this le-
gal malpractice action, the court granted plaintiff’s motion to re-
mand the case to a state court.249 
Similarly, in Porta Stor, Inc. v. Pods, Inc.,250 the U.S. District 
Court for the Middle District of Florida dismissed a patent law 
malpractice action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because, 
242  Chopra v. Townsend, Townsend & Crew LLP, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13471 (D. 
Col. 2008). 
243  Id. at *1–2. 
244  Id. 
245  See, e.g., Eddings v. Glast, No. 3:07-CV-1512-L, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48589 
(N.D. Tex. June 24, 2008) (declining federal jurisdiction over a patent law legal malprac-
tice case where the plaintiffs alleged that procedural errors of their attorneys led to a 
higher judgment against them in the underlying patent case and where plaintiffs’ theory 
of recovery did not depend on a substantial issue of patent law). 
246  Taylor v. Kochanowski, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20430 (E.D. Mich. 2008). 
247  Id. at *2–3. 
248  Id. at *5–6. 
249  Id. at *6–8. 
250  Porta Stor, Inc. v. Pods, Inc., No. 2:04-CV-0331, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22449 
(M.D. Fla. Mar. 21, 2008). 
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in the underlying patent infringement action, the court found ac-
cused device’s non-infringement of the patent in question, and no 
unresolved questions of federal patent law were left for the court to 
decide.251 
Moreover, in New Tek Manufacturing, Inc. v. Beehner,252 dis-
cussed in Part II.C, after remand and another appeal, the Supreme 
Court of Nebraska reasserted its jurisdiction over this patent law 
malpractice action.253  The court acknowledged the Federal Circuit 
decisions in Air Measurement and Immunocept delivered after the 
first appeal, stated that the case arose entirely under state law, and 
proceeded with the analysis of the doctrine of equivalents and the 
application of the prosecution history estoppel under federal patent 
law.254  In affirming summary judgment for the defense, the court 
determined that the prosecution history estoppel would have barred 
the underlying patent infringement claim.255 
On the other hand, there are indications that the effect of the 
Federal Circuit decisions in Air Measurement and Immunocept 
may spread beyond patent law malpractice cases.  In Nash v. Cor-
rect Care Solutions, LLC,256 a wrongful death action that included 
violation of civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court 
cited Air Measurement in denying plaintiff’s motion to reconsider 
its  previous decision to deny plaintiff’s motion to remand that was 
issued before the Federal Circuit decision in Air Measurement.257 
D.  Good News for Patent Attorneys and Their Insurance Carriers 
Federal Circuit decisions in Air Measurement and Immunocept 
may be good news for patent law practitioners and their insurance 
251  Id. at *27–28. 
252  New Tek Mfg., Inc. v. Beehner (New Tek), 702 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 2005). 
253  New Tek Mfg., Inc. v. Beehner (New Tek I), 751 N.W.2d 135, 144 (Neb. 2008). 
254  Id. at 144–51. 
255  Id. at 151. 
256  Nash v. Correct Care Solutions, LLC (Nash), No. 07-4065-JAR, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 79402 (D. Kan. Mar. 7, 2007). 
257  Id. (denying a motion to reconsider the order denying a motion to remand); see also 
Nash v. Correct Care Solutions, LLC (Nash I), No. 07-4065-JAR-JPO, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 75874 (D. Kan. Sept. 12, 2007) (denying a motion to remand).  Later the plaintiff 
amended the complaint by removing claims under federal law, and the court granted a 
motion to remand. See Nash v. Correct Care Solutions, LLC (Nash II), No. 07-4065-JAR, 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82926 (D. Kan. Nov. 6, 2007). 
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carriers.  On average, federal court litigation is more expensive, 
takes more attorney time, has lower recovery to legal fees ratio, 
and gives defendants better chances of success than similar litiga-
tion in a state court.258 
Some solo legal practitioners and small law firms who repre-
sent plaintiffs in legal malpractice suits already expressed concerns 
about the necessity to litigate legal malpractice cases in federal 
courts.259  The prospect of litigating their patent law malpractice 
suits in federal courts can compel plaintiffs to settle or may even 
discourage some potential plaintiffs from pursuing their malprac-
tice claims altogether. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the long-term effects of the Federal Circuit decisions 
in Air Measurement and Immunocept are uncertain, the decisions 
will definitely contribute to the uniformity and consistency in the 
patent law area.  Litigants in patent law malpractice cases will 
benefit from the experience of federal courts in adjudicating com-
plex matters of patent law.  The decisions will also benefit patent 
law practitioners and their malpractice insurance carriers since de-
fendants in such actions have better chances of success in federal 
courts. 
 
258  See, e.g., Henry, State Courts Hearing Patent Cases, supra note 233, at 51 (noting 
that plaintiffs prevail more often in state courts than in federal courts); Ted D. Lee & Ann 
Livingston, The Road Less Traveled: State Court Resolution of Patent, Trademark, or 
Copyright Disputes, 19 ST. MARY’S L.J. 703, 704 (1988) (noting that, in general, plain-
tiffs have better chances to win in state courts, and that state court litigation requires less 
attorney’s time, costs less, and has higher yields than similar litigation in federal courts); 
Elinson, $75 Million Suit, supra note 240 (reporting that attorneys who defend lawyers in 
legal malpractice suits often prefer to remove malpractice cases to federal courts and that 
federal courts are more willing than state courts to dismiss malpractice cases on summary 
judgments). 
259  See, e.g., Elinson, $75 Million Suit, supra note 240. 
